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THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE OF STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME - A CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE*
BY: V. A. ODOZI, DEPUTY GOVERNOR, CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA.
between policy and practice, between stated objectives and
actual performance. The observed policy lapses may be
Since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment
summarised as follows:Programme (SAP) in Nigeria in July 1986, a great deal of
interest has been shown in the subject. Indeed, it is generally
(i)
the pursuit of unduly restrictive trade and exchange
recognised that the SAP is by far the most compreqensive
control policies and measures which, in retrospect,
economic reform programme ever introduced in this country.
were counter-productive;
The interest and concerns shown are, therefore, understandable. Even with the termination of SAP as a two-year pro(ii) gross over-valuation of the naira exchange rate
gramme on 30th June, 1988, the changes fostered by it will
through deliberate administrative action; and
continue as a way of life and the subject will remain topical.
Indeed, this will not be the last se~ar on the SAP as there
(iil)
the lack of the political will to embark upon,
will be the need from time to time for a forum of this nature
and resolutely implement, warranted economic
to articulate the issues involved and review progress.
reform measures.
It is in the expectation that this seminar will contribute
to better understanding of the SAP and its impact on the
The combination of the above policy lapses resulted in
Nigerian economy and thereby serve the cause of public
gross mis-allocation of resources, stagnation of non-oil
enlightenment. We very much welcome the opportunity to
exports, increased reliance on imported items (including
food), high incidence of capital flight ( estimated at some
participate in it.
There are many perspectives and many leading issues to
$15 billion between 1981 and 1984) and other malpractices
the SAP. In presenting a Central Bank perspective on the
which not only undermined Government fiscal integrity
SAP we would in this paper address such aspects as the preand its management of the economy but also impoverished
the country.
SAP situation, the policy framework of the SAP and thereThe policy response to the emergent economic crisis
after review and appraise the programme. We would also
included the imposition of stringent and comprehensive
outline some of the leading issues on the SAP and the protrade and exchange controls under the Economic Stabilisablems and prospects of consolidating its gains.
tion Measures of 1982 and intensification of those controls
in 1984. These measures proved grossly inadequate in dealing
2. The Antecedents of the SAP
with the intractable· problems of the economy. On the
contrary they tended to aggravate the problems.
The backdrop to our discussion here is, of course, the
After the proclamation of a state of economic emergency
antecedents of the SAP. These are so well known and have
for
a period of 15 months effective from October 1985,
been articulated at many seminars and conferences that a
three policy options were considered by the Authorities
detailed presentation is not nee,~ssary here. By way of
namely:
recapitulation, it shou1d be stated that the oil-boom of
the 1970s brought with it massive oil revenue which the
(i)
to maintain the status quo i.e., a continuation of the
country could not prudently manage. Flushed with more
austerity
measures but without structural adjustmoney than they could efficiently manage, successive Government;
ments both at the Federal and State levels, embarked on huge
and expensive projects, many of which were of doubtful
(ii) to accept IMF structural adjustment facility inutility and viability. Moreover, there was a proliferation of
cluding its conditionalities;
public and private sector firms largely dependent on imported
inputs. Another feature of the oil-boom era was that it witness(iii)
to reject the IMF loan but adopt a variant of the
ed the emergence of widespread imbalances and distortions in
traditional ( typical) structural adjustment package,
the Nigerian economy. For instance, the country was transdesigned and implemented by Nigerians.
formed from one dependent on agriculture to one heavily
dependent on oil, while fiscal and external deficits prevailed.
After a great national debate, the IMF option was rejecBoth the heavy dependence on oil and on import rendered
ted. Nevertheless, the debate did establish that there was
the ecanomy vulnerable to external shocks. It was, therefore, not surprising that with the collapse of world oil
prices in mid-1981, an economic crisis emerged in Nigeria
* Being Text of Lecture delivered on 15th November, 198!f at a
although its existence and magnitude were not acknowSeminar on the theme "THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY SINCE THE

INTRODUCTION

ledeed or Fully appreciated at that tin1e.

STRVCTVRAL ADJVSTMrNT PROGRAMME: CDNSDLlDJ\TJON
Of GAINS" organised jointly by Messrs Akintola Williams & Co.
(Chartered Accountants) and International Bank for West Africa
Limited, at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria
Island, Lagos.

Another aspect of the pre-SAP era which is relevant to

this discussion, is the policy environment. Although

it is

true that there were a number of good policies and measures in the pre-SAP era, it is equally true that there were
a number of vital missing links and that the policy-mix was
far from being optimal. Even worse was the divergence
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urgent need for fundamental policy reform aimed at restructuring the economy and averting economic collapse.
If there was any doubt about the futility of half measures
which had been pursued by previous Administrations, there
could be no doubt that radical policy reforms could no
longer be resisted by late 1985 and early 1986 when the
country's international creditworthiness became so eroded
that the inflow of essential inputs was seriously impeded
as most overseas banks refused to extend further credit to
Nigerian banks which had accumulated huge arrears on
their confirmed letters of credit. This is the genesis of the
SAP which, owing to failing human memory or for reasons
of self interest, many critics have now conveniently forgotten.

first of all with the impact of the SAP on the Nigerian
economy and also with the wider issue of the performance
of the economy during the review period.
The Impact of the SAP on the Nigerian Economy
Although the adoption of the SAP has come to be acknowledged by Nigerians as inevitable, its implementation
and impact have continued to generate a great deal of controversy. This is understandable· beca4.se the impact of the
SAP has been mixed, the programme having had both positive and negative effects. Both these aspects will be examined
in this paper.

The Policy Framework of the SAP

3.

In dealing with the positive effects of the SAP, we would
first of all outline qualitatively and quantitatively, the
macro and micro-economic changes that have emerged since
the adoption of SAP.
The qualitative changes that are discernible are:

Objectives:
The key objectives of the SAP were:

(i)
(ii)

(iii)

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SAP

1.

the achievement of fiscal and balance of payments
viability over the short and medium terms;
laying the basis for sustainable non-inflationary
or minimal inflationary growth; and
improving the efficiency of the public and private
sectors.

(i)

increased cost consciousness and more rational
conduct on the part of economic agents;

(ii)

enhanced efficiency in resource allocation;

(iii)

drastic reduction in malpractices such as overinvoicing, diversion of import shipments, fraudulent
diversion of official foreign exchange to tt ;; parallel
market etc. Moreover, given the increased inflow
of autonomous funds and the quantum of goods
imported with off-shore funds, it may be asserted
that there has been a reversal of capital flight.
(Another way of viewing the present situation is
that the country is ietting better value in relative
terms from its less than $6 billion annual official
receipts now more than from its annual receipts
of over $20 billion in the early l 980's);

(iv)

easier access to foreign exchange and its fairer
distribution to the productive sectors of the economy;

(v)

enhanced export competitiveness;

(vi)

increased local sourcing;

(vii)

alteration of the internal terms of trade in favour of
the rural sector where the vast majority of Nigerians
live;

Policy Strategy:
The broad strategy of the SAP as an operational concept had the following basic elements:

{i)

the setting-up of a Second-Tier Foreign Exchange
Market (SFEM) as a mechanism for achieving a
realistic exchange rate for the naira and ensuring a
more efficient allocation of scarce foreign exchange
resources;

(ii)

the adoption of tight fiscal and monetary poficies;

(iii)

dismantling of price, trade and centralised exchange
controls i.e. trade and exchange liberalisation;

(iv)

rationalisation of Customs Tariff and Excise Duty
regimes;

(v)
(vi)

rationalisation and selective commercialisation/
privatisation of public enterprises; and
overhauling of the administrative structure.

(viii) reversal of the perverse phenomenon of ruralurban drift;

Most of the above policy measures such as trade and
exchange liberalisation, the SFEM, Customs Tariff and
Excise Duty rationalisation, etc, have since been implemented while action has been initiated in respect of others
such as commercialisation and privatisation of public enterprises.
The Nigerian Experience of the SAP (July 1986 to
June 1988)
The SAP is by definition an economic reform programme.
Consequently, this performance appraisal is intended to deal

4.
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(ix)

fostering of a maintenance culture and the evolution of local/appropriate technology and adaptive
research as well as productive recycling of used
materials; and

(x)

gradual restoration of international creditworthiness and confidence in Nigeria, (a positive development which has facilitated the debt rescheduling
negotiations).

--,-----------------------------------

Sectoral Performance

-

-

-

-

-

them was either to accept the logic of the SAP by looking
more inwards for their raw materials or to fold up. Consequently, a number of industrial sub-sectors such as food
and beverages; soap and detergent, tyres and tubes, beer and
stout, textiles and wearing apparels; non-metallic mineral
products; domestic and industrial plastics and rubber have
achieved a large measure of local sourcing.
Industrial output, as measured by the index of industrial
production (1972=100), increased by 0.1% in 1987 in
contrast to a decline of 3 .9% in 1986. In the first half of
1988, further progress has been made with industrial production recording an increase of 8.3% over the level achieved in
the corresponding period of 1987.
With respect to industrial capacity utilisation, encouraging improvement has also been made. Average capacity
utilisation increased from 36.4% in 1986 to 40.4% in 1987
and further to 40.7% in the first half of 1988. There were,
however, marked sectoral variations. While domestic resource-based enterprises such as tyres and tubes, textiles, printing
and publishing, paper manufacture, beer, soft drinks, nonmetallic mineral products, etc. achieved high levels of capacity utilisation, those heavily dependent on imported inputs such as electrical and electronics group and basic metal,
iron and steel, operated at rather low levels of their installed
capacities.

(i)

Agricultural Sector
Available statistics show that more hectares of land have
been brought under cultivation in respect of various crops.
For instance, in 1987, hectares brought under cocoa production increased by 31.5% while increases of 11.3%, 6.9% and
2.6% were recorded in respect of maize, cotton and rubber
respectively. Moreover, corporate bodies have increased
their investment in agricultural production not only to
meet their raw material needs locally, but also to take
advantage of higher sales prices for agricultural commodities.
With the alteration of relative prices arising from the
significant depreciation of the naira, together with other
export incentives, non-oil exports have recorded very encouraging results in terms of value, volume and product-mix.
For instance, the total value of non-oil exports rose from
N497.2 million in 1985 to N552.1 million and Nl,500.9
million in 1986 and 1987 respectively. This performance
has been sustained if not surpassed in 1988 with non-oil
exports up to June amounting to Nl ,397.4 million, representing an increase of 11.2% over the level achieved in the corresponding period of 1987. And inspite of the declining world
market prices for some of our non-oil exports, their local
prices have risen significantly. This development has improved the incomes and living standards of farmers of cash
crops. The more attractive domestic prices for agricultural
products have led to increased production and induced
higher export volumes and earnings. For example, in 1986,
the total volume and value of agricultural ( distinguished
from total non-oil) exports were 307 .0 thousand tons and
N482.2 million respectively, indicating increases of 98.6%
and 93.3% over their respective levels in 1985. The corresponding increases in 1987 over the 1986 levels were 40.4%
and 209.4% respectively.
These developments in the agricultural and non-oil export
sectors since the SAP are very encouraging and there are
prospects for more significant achievements in the near
future provided the present liberal policy thrust is maintained in order to sustain confidence and encourage producers to take a long, rather than short-term view in their
agricultural investment decisions.

(iii) The Financial Sector
Government revenue from crude petroleum has been
boosted by the SAP-induced depreciation of the naira. This
has made it possible i'or Government at both the Federal and
State levels not only to pay accumulated arrears of salaries
and wages of their employees but to remain current in respect of personal emoluments. Moreover, these Governments
have been able to repay substantial amounts of outstanding
debt owed to local contractors thereby enabling most of
them to resume their businesses which had folded up as a
result of the accumulation of debt by Government since the
late l 970's. It is also relevant here to refer to the activities
of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure
(DFRRI). Since its establishment in 1986, DFRRI has invested over NI billion nai1a in the provision of rural feeder
roads, rural water supply, electrification and housing programmes nationwide. This concern for the welfare of our
rural majority is unparalleled in the history of this country.
The revamping and transformation of the rural sector and
enhancement of the rural-urban terms of trade in favour of
the rural sector would not have been possible without the
SAP-induced boost in Government revenue from oil and
in the incomes of farmers.

Industrial Sector
The industrial sector witnessed some far-reaching SAPinduced changes.
With the enhanced naira prices and incomes to miners
arising from the significant depreciation of the naira with
the advent of the SFEM in September, 1986, there has been
a remarkable revival in the production of some solid minerals. For instance, the output of cassiterite, columbite and
limestone increased by 261.5, 113 .1 and 85 .6% respectively
in 1987 in contrast to declines of 87.0, 91.0 and 23.4%
respectively in 1986. Moreover, increased investments are
being made to raise the production of tin.
Another significant SAP-induced development in the
industrial sector is increased local sourcing. In response to
the sustained depreciation of the naira and the prohibition
of the importation of some raw materials, such as wheat
and rice, etc. local manufacturers have been compelled to
look more inwards for the sourcing of their raw materials.
Indeed, for many business firms, the choice presented to
(ii)

(iv) Monetary Policy Measures
The upward revision of deposit rates has stimulated
savings mobilisation with total savings growing significantly
by 31.3% to :r-115.09 billion as at the end of 1987 from a
level of N 11.49 billion in 1986. There has been a further
increase of 19 .3% in 1988 with savings reaching a high
level ofJ\li18.0l billion as at the end of August.
Although the divergence between the average deposit.
rate and the average lending rate is wider than desirable, the
impact. of the prevailing interest rate regime since the introduction of the SAP has on balance been positive; it has
encouraged competition among banks in canvassing for
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of the tariff. It should, however, be noted that
this problem has tended to be unduly exaggerated
since, in reality, less than 25% of {S)FEM funds
allocated for imports went to general merchandise
{which includes some essential items such as spare
parts, books, educational materials, drugs and
pharmaceuticals etc) as against about 70% for the
industrial sector;

deposits, promoted savings mobilisation and more efficient
use of loanable funds.

The External Sector

( v)

As indicated earlier, the introduction of the SAP has
brought about more efficient allocation of foreign exchange
and enhanced the inflow of autonomous funds.
Arising from the improvement in the merchandise trade
account and the reduction in the deficit in the services
account, the current account swung from a deficit of
$972 million in 1986 to a surplus of $505 million in 1987.
The trade balance improved from a surplus of $2,710 million
in 1986 to $3,732 million in 1987 while the overall balance
of payments moved from a deficit of $560.0 million in 1986
to a surplus of $38.0 million in 1987. Although the pressure
on the external sector persisted and even intensified in 1987
as shown by the widening of the financing gap from $4,009
million in 1986 to $4,764 million in 1987, what is of significance and more relevant in our present context is the
trade balance which has recorded a significant improvement
since the introduction of the SAP, with the depreciation
of the naira achieving the dual objectives of, import compression, even in the face of trade liberalisation, and export expansion.
The various economic reform measures introduced under
the SAP by enhancing international confidence have made
it possible for Nigeria to make progress in the rescheduling
of her external debt obligations. Indeed, remarkable success
has been achieved with the recent agreement reached with
the London Club of creditors on the rescheduling of a total
of U.S. $5.9 billion involving medium and long-term debt,
which were consolidated and rescheduled over a period of
20 years including a 3-year grace period, and trade arrears
{letters of credit) payable over a period of 12 years.
In light of the size and terms of the rescheduling, that was
a remarkable achievement. It should be noted here that
debt rescheduling is intended to bring debt relief arising from
payments being stretched out over a longer period. thereby
reducing current debt service payments while permitting the
country to devote a larger proportion of current receipts to
meet the basic needs of the country. Moreover, over time,
it is envisaged that the economy would grow and be in
a better position to service external debt obligations in
future.
II.

(iv)

(v)

5.

(ii)

credit squeeze arising from the tight monetary
policy pursued as a demand management strategy
in support of the SFEM. This has meant especially
in late 1986 and most of 1987, low aggregate demand and a constraint on the sustained increase in
capacity utilisation in a number of sectors;

(iii)

increased incidence of importation of finished
goods, some of it of doubtful utility, arising from
trade liberalisation and ineffective implementation

Issues, Problems and Prospects of the SAP

As indicated earlier, there is a great deal of controversy
over the implementation and impact of the SAP. This divergence of opinion and its vocal expression are understandable
in a free society such as ours and given the far-reaching
nature of the recent economic reform measures and the
often conflicting interests of various groups in society.
In the foregoing appraisal, effort was made to present the
situation objectively and in a balanced manner.
Beyond that assessment, there are a number of leading
issues in the SAP, an exploration of which I hope would
serve to clarify matters further and moderate, if not finally
resolve, the controversies. Consequently, I shall now briefly
discuss some leading issues in, and problems and prospects
of, the SAP.
I.

On the negative side, the SAP has engendered the following repercussions:
{S)FEM-induced inflation;

some business failures arising largely from undue
import dependence, over-exposure and inefficiency of the firms concerned. Nevertheless, new
businesses have emerged and some old ones have,
through acquisitions, mergers and rationalisation
moved to exploit new frontiers of opportunity
offered by the advent of the new policy and business environments. This is part of the dynamic
process called structural adjustment.

In concluding this review and performance appraisq]_, I
wish to stress that on balance, the impact of the SAP has
been quite positive having stabilised the Nigerian economy
by halting the drift to economic collapse which was manifest
on the eve of the introduction of the SAP.

ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SAP

{i)

the burden of settlement rate for pre-FEM transactions. However, Government has made significant
concessions to importers by absorbing the bulk of
the burden of exchange rate depreciation; and

(i)

LEADING ISSUES

Funding of the FEM
It is recognised that adequate funding of the FEM is
desirable and crucial for the success of the SAP. This is
why Government has consistently given top priority to the
funding of the (S)FEM since its inception and even maintained official funding of the market at levels that may
reasonably be considered as unsustainable, given the quantum of official foreign exchange receipts in recent times.
It is, therefore, a matter for regret that otherwise wellinformed commentators including bankers who should know
better, continue to urge that the level of official funding be
significantly increased.
It should be stressed that there are many competing needs
for foreign exchange not the least of which is the need to
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terms, they must adjust their exchange rates realistically.

maintain reserve adequacy in order to sustain both domestic
and international confidence in our currency. In the face of
the severe compression of official foreign exchange receipts
and the generous concessions granted to exporters of nonoil products and other foreign exchange earners since September 1986, it is legitimate to expect that the private sector
which is the main beneficiary of these concessions, should
contribute more meaningfully to the funding of the FEM.
To this end, the Central Banlc, in collaboration with other
Government agencies, i$ intensifying the monitoring of nonoil exports to ensure that the proceeds are repatriated in an
approved manner and put to use for the benefit of the
economy. Ultimately, in the medium to long term, the FEM
should be self-supporting, with the monetary authorities
only intervening to ensure stability in the market.

(c)

The current concern about the huge gap between the
official tender rate and the effective autonomous funds
rate is not misplaced. This is because such a wide divergence is capable of creating distortions and fostering
malpractices. We cannot now go into the sources
of the divergence. What should be noted is that the
substantial narrowing of the gap is a major policy goal
and that concerted efforts are being made to foster the
convergence process.

(d)

Let me now make a final point on the exchange rate
question. In keeping with prevailing policy, the naira
exchange rate will continue to be largely determined
by market forces. However, the exchange rate in an
economy such as ours, cannot be a matter of benign
neglect to be left entirely to market forces. Consequently, it is expected that the Central Banlc will
intervene in the FEM from time to time when such
intervention (I do not say interference) is deemed
necessary to give support and direction to the market
and ensure its orderliness.

(ii)

Exchange Rate Developments
Exchange rate developments in the FEM have aroused
so much controversy. Given the critical role of the exchange
rate not only in household and business decision-making
but also as an instrument of macro-economic management,
exchange rate developments since the introduction of the
SFEM have attracted a great deal of interest and some measure of concern. The main areas of concern are the massive
depreciation of the naira, exchange rate instability and, in
recent months, the huge divergence between the rates emerging from the official bidding sessions and the rates in the
autonomous segment of the market. In order to put the
exchange rate question in its proper perspective, I would
state the following points:
(a)

The exchange rate is a price, which, in a free-market
environment, is the outcome of the interplay of the
forces of supply and demand as mediated by the
numerous participants in the market. The massive
depreciation of the naira exchange rate with the
advent of the SFEM has arisen largely from the substantial shortfall in the supply of foreign exchange
relative to demand. The fact that speculative pressures
have also been at work does not invalidate the fundamental issue of supply and demand; indeed, speculative
pressures may well be manifestations of uneasiness
about an underlying supply inadequacy or the unsustainability of the level of official funding.

(b)

In spite of its limitations and imperfections, the
(S)FEM has achieved a more realistic exchange rate
regime in Nigeria than during the pre-SFEM era. If
there was a choice between overvaluation and undervaluation of the naira, the preference, which may not
be popular with the users of foreign exchange, should
be for an undervalued one. In this connection, it
should be noted that the deliberate undervaluation
of the Japanese Yen and the South Korean Won for
sustained periods was a critical factor in the economic
miracles achieved by these two economic giants. On
the other hand, the deliberate overvaluation of the
currencies of most developing countries over long
periods was largely responsible for the economic
predicaments of those countries. Consequently, if they
are to stabilise their economies and achieve economic
viability and self-reliance in the medium and long-

(iii) External Balance vis-a-vis Internal Balance
Some critics allege that policy instruments under the SAP
have tended to focus on external balance at the expense,
of internal balance. Such critics go on to propose that the
external sector should be marginalised.
Perhaps, I should explain that policies such as exchange
rate re-alignment, commercialisation and privatisation,
trade and exchange liberalisation etc., to the extent that they
affect relative prices in the domestic economy, efficiency in
resource allocation and the internal terms of trade, are indeed aimed at securing internal balance.
Moreover, the call for the marginalisation of the external
sector although possibly well-intentioned -and patriotic is
not well-informed. This is because policies of autarky and
protectionism are now not only unfashionable but also
potentially injurious to those countries which might wish
to indulge in them because of the risk of retaliation by other
countries and adverse weliare implications. Again, in an
increasingly and irreversibly interdependent world, no
country can go it alone, producing all its need and consuming all it produces. What we need is self reliance, a major
goal of SAP, and not just marginalising the external sector.
We cannot contract out of the international economy of
which we are a part. It is more meaningful to enlarge our
share of the international market and diversify our economic
base to make the country less vulnerable to external shocks.
(iv) The Performance of the Banking Industry Under SAP
With the advent of the SAP, the operational environment of banks has been significantly transformed. This
transformation has brought about far-reaching changes in the
character, style, operation, risks, strategy and fortunes of
banks. Some of the major discernible changes may be outlined as follows:
(a)
31

There has been increased competition among banlcs.
Following the measures taken on the introduction of

the SAP to mop up excess liquidity in the banking
system through the call-in of customer deposits with
banks awaiting foreign exchange cover and the subsequent deregulation of interest rates, there has been
an aggressive drive by banks to attract time-deposits
through offering competitive and attractive interest
rates to depositors.
{b)

(c)

complex. However, it is pertinent to state that given the
circumstances of the country, no rational or responsible
Government could be indifferent to these issues some of
which have to do with questions of fiscal viability and
efficiency. The price of benign neglect is high in both political and socio-economic terms and it is laudable that this
Administration has courageously addressed these issues
and taken warranted action in the best interest of the country.

There are indications that the cost of bank funds,
cost of lending and overheads etc. have gone up since
the SAP. The extent to which'margins could be maintained is severely constrained by the level of loan demand and borrowing rates. In some cases, high interest
rates charged for loans might mean poor loan quality
and ultimately increased provisions for bad and doubtful debts, "non-performing assets" and write-offs.
Although many banks have had profitable operations
under the SAP, a substantial part of which has been
generated from their foreign exchange transactions,
the returns to banks relative to their capital base and
funds employed are not out of tune with the earnings
of comparable firms in the manufacturing and commercial sectors of the economy. Moreover, with the
escalation in personnel costs and increased competition
arising from the rapid growth in the number of banking
firms, it is unlikely that the present level of profitability in the industry will be sustained in the medium and
long-terms.

II. Current and Anticipated Problems
In spite of the significant achievements of the SAP as
discussed above, the Nigerian economy is confronted by
a number of problems which are bound to have serious
implications for sustained growth and development. Consequently, even as we seek to consolidate the gains of the
SAP, close attention will have to be paid to these problems
with a view to ameliorating them and thereby removing the
clog to sustained growth and development. These problems
which affect various sectors of the economy can only be
outlined here as follows:

Given the increasing competition and the erosion of
bank margins, far-reaching rationalisation is taking
place in the industry. These rationalisation efforts
include: restructuring and realignment of offices and
departments, computerisation, redeployment of staff,
strategic planning etc.

It is recognised that banks have a crucial role to play in
the implementation of various aspects of the SAP especially
with respect to {S)FEM operations and mobilisation and
allocation of scarce resources. Their performance has increasingly been subjected to scrutiny by the regulatory
authorities and concern has been expressed by members of
the public about their role. There are indications that so far
the banking industry as a group has been generally responsive
to the needs of the economy by channelling resources to the
productive sectors and observing legality. If that was not the
case, there would not have been any semblance of order in
the financial system nor indeed the whole economy. However, there have been areas of slippage in the performance
of banks and there exists enormous scope for improvement.
Banks should, therefore, in their own interest ensure that
their customers' needs are well served at all times and that
they adhere strictly to the letter and spirit of the regulations
governing their operations.

(i)

slow growth in output and underutilisation of
iastalled capacity;

(ii)

undue monetary expansion and inflationary pressures;

(iii)

unemployment
in spite of the commendable
efforts of the National Directorate of Employment
in job creation activities, the unemployment situation appears to be deteriorating because the already
saturated labour market continues to be flooded by
a large number of primary, post-primary and postsecondary graduates ·as well as some retrenched
workers.

(iv)

balance of payment pressures arising from the severe
compression in foreign exchange receipts from
earnings and external loan draw-downs in the face
of high demand. In this connection, the instability
and deterioration in the world oil and other commodity markets is a matter of serious concern, underscoring the continued vulnerability of the country
to external shocks.

(v)

exchange rate developments and the wide divergence in the rates for official auction funds and
those of autonomous funds, which is capable of
introducing distortions and malpractices into the
FEM.
It should be stressed that while a number of the problems
listed above have been long with us some others emerged in
the course of executing the SAP.

Other Leading Issues
There are some other leading issues such as the deregulation of interest rates, commercialisation/privatisation of
public sector enterprises, phasing out of subsidies, the
debt conversion programme, the burden of settlement rate
for pre-SFEM transactions etc. Given the time constraint,
I cannot explore these issues some of which are rather

(v)

III . Prospects
The prospects for the economy in achieving recovery
and growth will depend not only on the resoluteness with
which the policies initiated under the aegis of the SAP are
pursued but also on the responsiveness of Nigerians in
accepting the challenges and exploiting the opportunities
32

resist and to defer rational economic reform until it was on
the edge of a precipice.
The far-reaching economic reform measures introduced
under the auspices of the SAP (July 1986 to June 1988)
have generally been acknowledged as comprehensive, bold
and viable. I have outlined the policy framework of the
reform programme which has, as its major objectives, the
enhancement of economic efficiency and self reliance,
structural transformation, restoration of confidence and the
establishment of a stable liberal macro-economic environment with greater reliance on market forces. The various
policies under the SAP have the potential not only for stabilising the economy in the short-term, which has in fact been
accomplished, but also for initiating recovery and growth in
the medium- and long-term. I have also made a provisional
assessment of the SAP in Nigeria. Although its initial impact
has been mixed and there were some unavoidable adverse
repercussions, on the whole the SAP has been signiflcantly
positive in terms of promoting more efficient allocation of
resources and enhancing the investment climate. In particular, trade and exchange liberalisation, the reduction of wasteful and time-consuming bureaucratic processes, the accent
on financial discipline, encouragement of commercialisation
and privatisation of public sector enterprises and the fostering of fairer competition among economic agents all of which
have happened under the SAP have introduced a large measure of realism and order in macro-economic management,
and enhanced business confidence and performance. I have
also considered the current and anticipated problems and the
prospects of the economy. The kernel of my presentation
here is that, assuming the resolute pursuit of economic reform beyond June 1988 and well into the l 990's, the prognosis is that although Nigeria will continue to contend with
some serious problems such as inadequate domestic and
foreign exchange resources, pressure on the balance of payments, inflation, unemployment etc., it will have a fitter and
more buoyant economy in the l 990's. By then, her economy
would have been adequately restructured to secure durable
external. and internal balance and her sources of foreign
exchange sufficiently diversified to insulate the country from
adverse developments in the international economy.
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, in concluding this
lecture, I should like to invite special attention to the following points:
First, the far-reaching economic reform measures introduced under the SAP are being pursued at a time when the
country's economic problems have converged and become
overwhelming, while the resources available for stabilisation
and initiating recovery and growth have become severely
compressed. In particular, the international economic
environment has become increasingly unfavourable, if not
hostile, while official foreign exchange receipts have declined
to about one quarter of what the country was receiving
about eight years ago. For instance, the country's average
selling price for crude oil declined from a peak of about
$40.00 per barrel in 1980 to less than $15.00 in 1986
and about $18.00 in 1987 while daily oil sales declined
from over 2 million barrels per day to about 1.3 million
barrels per day during this period. Moreover, the country's
official foreign exchange receipts plunged from a peak of
about $26 billion in 1980 to about $ I 2 billion in each of
1982 and 1985 and further to S7 billion in 1986 and less

which the new policy and business environments offer.
Some elaboration here would be in order as it would serve
to clarify the position and give a more credible prognosis.
First, the success of our external debt rescheduling efforts,
which is contingent on our resolutely pursuing rational
economic reform, would reduce the rate of foreign exchange
disbursement and improve the external reserve position of
the country as well as release more foreign exchange for
current productive activities. Moreover, the Debt Conversion
Programme (DCP) recently approved by Government, if
effectively implemented, should help to reduce the external
debt burden of the country and to stimulate both capital
formation and foreign investment.
Second, substantial potential for diversification exists
both in the oil industry and non-oil exports. In this connection, the shortfall in crude oil receipts is likely to be more
than compensated for, by export receipts from liquefied
natural gas and petrochemical down-stream operations which
are expected to be fully operational by the mid-1990's.
Moreover, the innovative oil marketing strategy including
off-shore operations, recently adopted by NNPC should
yield positive results by enhancing receipts from the oil
industry. With respect to non-oil exports, diversification
into other products including processing with increased local
value added, is a viable alternative.
Third, it would be naive to think that even in the pursuit
of national economic self-sufficiency and reliance, we could
deal without the outside world. We need to exploit the
opportunities for trade to enhance our foreign exchange
resources. Moreover, in view of the prevailing large unused
industrial capacity, unemployment and resource gap problems, the country needs the inflow of additional external
resources in the form of Official Development Assistance
(ODA), project-tied multi-lateral and bilateral loans as well
as direct capital investment of the right quantum and terms
to accelerate the economic recovery process and mitigate the
painful side-effects of structural adjustment in the shortterm and initiate a more confident resumption of growth in
real GDP, in the medium and long-terms. The policy and
business environments are now more conducive to external
inflows. Government has also taken further initiatives
such as the establishment of the Industrial Development Co-ordinating Committee (IDCC) by Decree 36 of
1988 and Nigeria's membership of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) both of which are intended
to enh~e the climate for foreign investment.
Fourth, it is expected that the 1989 Budget would deal
with the observed areas of leakage and imperfection in the
achievement of policy objectives.
Finally, the imperative of structural adjustment, namely
self-reliance, is being gradually integrated into our society
as a way of life. With all these and inspite of the problems
besetting the country, there is reason to believe that the
prospects for the future are good.
6.

Summary and Conclusions

In this lecture, I have considered the Nigerian economy in
retrospect, its current problems, and its prospects. It is the
story of our country which, for a period of over two decades,
had pursued policies of stringent trade and exchange controls
and for over one decad~ maintained an overvalued currency
through deliberate administrative action. It continued to
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consolidate the gains of the programme and minimise its
adverse side effects.
Fifth, executing a comprehensive and ambitious economic
reform programme such as the SAP has been a unique
learning process for the country with important lessons
never to be forgotten. It would have been stimulating pursuing this theme but I must resist that temptation because
of time constraint. In passing, however, let me state that
SAP has confirmed the twin problem of predictability and
control of human behaviour which confronts social scientists, businessmen and policy makers; it has engendered
pragmatism as a viable way of coping with trade-offs and
dilemmas which emerge in the execution of an economic
reform programme. This is the basic instinct for balance,
for a middle way, for survival. Again, there is the vital lesson
that our economic redemption lies in our own hands; although foreign assistance and capital are necessary, they
should be seen more as a supplement to, and not a substitute
for, our own indigenous efforts. There is also the prevalence
of policy - impact lags - i.e. policy measures take time to
achieve the desired objectives. In this connection while it has
been the lot of this Administration to muster the political
will to embark on these far-reaching economic reform measures, the main beneficiaries will be the next civilian regime
which will inherit a more durable, diversified, self-reliant and
buoyant economy.

than $6 billion in 1987. The prospects for 1988 are even
worse. Such a drastic reduction in a critical resource such as
foreign exchange cannot but be destabilising. It also explains the progressive depreciation of the naira in the FEM.
Second, although the achievements made in executing
the SAP have manifested less visibly than the adverse sideeffects, the impact of the SAP has on balance been quite
qualitative and positive. The overall performance of the
economy in 1987 (the first full year of the SAP) showed
some improvement over the preceding year judging by
the various macro-economic indicators I have given earlier
in this lecture. Consequently, although it could be said
that the country continued to be confronted by serious
economic problems, the economy moved in the direction in
1987 and the improvements made far outweighed the adverse
trends. Further improvements have been made in the first
half of 1988. It should be stressed that the situation in the
country would have been much worse if the economic
reform programme had not been in place. For one thing,
if the country had continued to pursue policies of stringent
trade and exchange controls together with the overvalued
exchange rate regime, the bulk of the $6 billion current
official ;receipts would have ended up in the parallel market
through fraudulent diversion; industrial capacity utilisation
would have been much lower and acute supply shortages
would have ensued. Moreover, non-oil exports would have
stagnated further, Government naira revenue from oil would
have been about a quarter of the present levels and Government fiscal integrity would have been seriously impaired.
International confidence in the Nigerian economy would
have been seriously eroded thereby impeding the inflow of
essential imports. The logical conclusion of this scenario of
what would have happened if the country had failed to adopt
the economic reform measures is economic collapse. It
is, therefore, a matter for regret that many people who apprraise the impact of the (S)FEM have tended to focus only
on the negative side-effects without acknowledging its overall
positive impact. The tendency by some self-styled experts
to blame (S)FEM or SAP for all our problems is both naive
and unfair; such pre-occupation cannot serve the cause of
national economic recovery and the resumption of growth.
Third, the SAP should be seen as a way of life. "The
reforms are permanent changes." In our circumstances, it
represents the triumph of rationality, an effective response to
chronic imbalances and disequilibria in the economy.
Fourth, the country now faces hard options and tradeoffs because there is no easy way out of our problems.
Nevertheless, the SAP, viewed more meaningfully as a way
of life and a scheme for rational economic management and
good order rather than a two-year programme (July 1986
to June 1988), is the best option open to the country. It
has reversed the drift of the country to collapse and the
economy is now in the transition stage between recovery
and growth. However, the transition has been prolonged and
rendered rather painful because of the neglect of the past
and the deep-seated nature of our economic problems
as well as the drastic compression of the resources needed
to execute this ambitious and courageous reform programme.
What is called for now is not an abandonment of the path
of rational economic reform but its resolute pursuit. Nevertheless, the implementation of the various components of
the SAP will be reviewed and modified from time to time to

A final point!

Nigerians must work hard and productively, honestly and
patiently to restore the economy on the path of growth
along the lines mapped out by the SAP. The road to national
self-sufficiency is long, rough and arduous and sacrifices are
unavoidable. In any case, the ruin of the economy which
took over 20 years to executive cannot be remedied in only
2 years no matter how efficacious the present therapy.
This is the logical imperative of the SAP, a challenge which
we as Nigerians could fail to accept only to our detriment.
All hands must, therefore, be on deck to put the economy on
an even keel and launch it on the longed-for path of growth.
Indeed, as a country and a people, we have no other rational
choice.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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Table 1
COMMERCIAL BANKS SAVINGS & TIME DEPOSITS
(N Million)

Dec.
1985
Time
Savings
Total

Dec.
1987
(3)

August
1988
(4)

(I) & (2)

(I)

Dec.
1986
(2)

6,850.8
3,700.0

7,217.6
4,270.1

9,882.0
5,206.7

11,619.1
6,389.5

10,550.8

11,487.7

I 5,088.7

18,008.6

Ab

Growth Between
(2) & (3)

I

%

Ab

+366.8
+570.1

+5.3
+15.4

+936.9

+8.9

I

(3) & (4)
%

Ab

%

+2,664.4
+936.4

+36.9
+21.9

+l,737.1
+i,182.8

+17.6
+22.7

+3,601.0

+31.3

+2,919.9

+19.3

Table 2
SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN EXOIANGE THROUGH SFEM 1987 - 1988
Sectors

w

Vt

Jan - June
1987

% Of Total

July - Dec.
1987

%Of Total

Jan - June
1988

%Of Total

VISIBLE IMPORTS (~ million)

1,810.8

92.4

635.3

79.7

1,300.4

91.2

I. Industrial Sector
(i) Raw Materials
(ii) Machinery Spare Parts & CKD

1,295.7
737.6
558.1

66.1
37.6
28.5

368.2
154.7
213.5

46.2
19.4
26.8

909.7
509.1
400.6

63.8
35.7
28.I

2. Agricultural Sector

8:9

0.5

3.7

0.5

8.2

0.6

3. Finished Goods
(i) Food
(ii) General Merchandise
(iii) Capital Goods - Aircraft Shipping

506.2

25.8

263.4

33.1

382.5

26.8

140.9
354.5
10.8

7.2
I 8.1
0.6

I 18.1
140.5
4.9

14.8
17.6
0.6

78.9
298.8

5.5
21.0
0.3

INVISIBLE IMPORTS(~ millions)
(i) Education
(ii) Personal Home Remittances
(iii) Airline Remittance
(iv) Travel
(v) Re-Insurance
(vi) Contract
(vii) Aircraft Lease Maintenance Fees
(viii) Shipping Vessels Charter & Maintenance
(ix)
Investment Income Profit & Dividends
(x) Others

149.9

7.6

161.4

20.3

125.3

8.8

6.1
13.9
42.4
II.I
2.1
5.3
1.5
5.7
17.8
44.0

0.3
0.7
2.2
0.6
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.9
2.2

12.4
13.9
38.7
8.4
2.3
6.6
6.9
5.1
16.1
51.0

1.6
4.9
I.I
0.3
0.8
0.9
0.6
2.0
6.4

5.7
11.0
17.5
12.6
4.7
11.9
7.7
5.4
8.4
40.4

0.4
0.8
1.2
0.9
0.3
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.6
2.8

1,960.7

100.0

796.7

100.0

1,425.7

100.0

TOTAL ( A & 13)

1.7

4.8

